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Abstract—An exploit involving the greatest common divisor
(GCD) of RSA moduli was recently discovered [1]. This paper
presents a tool that can efﬁciently and completely compare a large
number of 1024-bit RSA public keys, and identify any keys that
are susceptible to this weakness. NVIDIA’s graphics processing
units (GPU) and the CUDA massively-parallel programming
model are powerful tools that can be used to accelerate this
tool. Our method using CUDA has a measured performance
speedup of 27.5 compared to a sequential CPU implementation,
making it a more practical method to compare large sets of
keys. A computation for ﬁnding GCDs between 200,000 keys,
i.e., approximately 20 billion comparisons, was completed in 113
minutes, the equivalent of approximately 2.9 million 1024-bit
GCD comparisons per second.
Keywords-CUDA, RSA, greatest common divisor, parallel com
putation

I. I NTRODUCTION
RSA is a public key encryption scheme which relies on
the difﬁculty of factoring large numbers. The algorithm is
prevalent throughout security, and speciﬁcally common in
web-related applications. An RSA public key is comprised of
a modulus n of speciﬁed length (the product of primes p and
q), and an exponent e. The length of n is given in terms of
bits, thus the term “1024-bit RSA key” refers to the number of
bits which make up this value. The associated private key uses
the same n, and another value d such that d · e = 1 mod φ(n)
where φ(n) = (p − 1) · (q − 1)[2]. Ideally, given the number
of possible primes that may be used to construct a 1024-bit
modulus, no random number generators should reuse either
prime. Thus, the probability of either p or q being repeated in
a set of keys should be approximately 0. An individual key
may be considered secure by itself, but when compared to
other keys, might exhibit a weakness which allows each key’s
d to be calculated entirely from public information.
When considering two keys, a weakness exists when the
greatest common divisor of both moduli, n1 and n2 , is greater
than 1. If GC D(n1 , n2 ) = p, then p must be a shared prime
factor of n1 and n2 . Thus, q1 = np1 and q2 = np2 . Once p and
q are known, d1 and d2 can be directly calculated, yielding
both private keys.
This weakness is discussed in [1], which showed a sig
niﬁcant number of existing RSA keys were susceptible to
this exploit. The primary goal of our work was to speedup
the most computationally intensive part of their process by
implementing the GCD comparisons of RSA 1024-bit keys
using NVIDIA’s CUDA platform.

To aid in accomplishing this goal, the work in [3] was
expanded and adapted to compare all combinations of keys
in a given set. In comparison to their work, larger sections
of the overall program were able to be executed in parallel,
resulting in further speedup.
II. R ELAT ED W ORK
The work documented in [1] served as inspiration for this
work. Here, Lenstra et al. performed a sanity check of a wide
array of public RSA keys contained in SSL certiﬁcates and
SSH host keys. Their discovery that a signiﬁcant fraction of
these keys (roughly 0.2%) were weak led to our desire to
parallelize their investigation in order to make it as efﬁcient
as possible with commodity hardware.
The CUDA implementation of the binary GCD algorithm
that was built upon (cf. [3]) is an important example of similar
work being done. On a fundamental level, our work mirrors
theirs as we based the core of our algorithm on their work,
speciﬁcally 1024-bit GCDs were calculated in parallel using
CUDA. However, we expanded its relevance with modiﬁca
tions in order to automatically divide and parallelize lists of
large values to compare.
Another example of work that makes use of the GPU for
security applications is solving discrete logarithms as pre
sented in [4]. A set of large-precision operations (768-bit) was
necessary for this work, and was thus implemented in CUDA.
This was similar to our own starting point due to the currentlylimited CUDA support for large-precision numbers. Because
these large values have numerous applications in computer
security, the work shown here displays another component
of computer security where parallelizing work with the large
values can be highly advantageous.
Our work is an example of an amalgamation of other related
works. It functions as a supplement to the other materials
mentioned here, and provides another example of a computer
security application that signiﬁcantly beneﬁts from using par
allelization with commodity Single Instruction, Multiple Data
(SIMD) multiprocessors. What sets it apart is its use of 1024
bit RSA keys and the method of parallelization implemented.
III. OVERVIEW OF CUDA
CUDA is a platform that provides a set of tools along
with the ability to write programs that make use of NVIDIA’s
GPUs (cf. [5]). These massively-parallel hardware devices are
capable of processing large amounts of data simultaneously,

allowing signiﬁcant speedups in programs with sections of
parallelizable code using the SIMD model. The platform
allows for various arrangements of threads to perform work,
based on the developer’s decomposition of the problem. Our
solution to the problem presented in this paper is discussed
in §VI-B. In general, individual threads are grouped into upto 3-dimensional blocks to allow sharing of common memory
between threads. These blocks can then be organized into a
2-dimensional grid.
The GPU breaks the total number of threads into groups
called warps, which consist of 32 threads that will be executed
simultaneously on a single streaming multiprocessor (SM).
The GPU consists of several SMs which are each capable
of executing a warp. Blocks are scheduled to SMs until all
allocated threads have been executed.
There is also a memory hierarchy on the GPU. There are 3
types of memory that are relevant to this work: global memory
is the slowest and largest; shared memory is much faster, but
also signiﬁcantly smaller; and a limited number of registers
that each SM has access to. Each thread in a block can access
the same section of shared memory.
IV. A LGORITHM D ESCRIPTION
A. Binary GCD
Binary GCD is a well-known algorithm for computing the
greatest common divisor of two numbers. Instead of relying
on costly division operations like Euclid’s algorithm, bitwise
shifts are employed. The implementation presented in this
paper follows the outline displayed in Algorithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: Binary GCD algorithm outline
Input: x and y: two integers.
Output: The greatest common divisor of x and y.
repeat
if x and y are both even then
GC D(x, y) = 2 · GC D( x2 , y2 );
else if x is even and y is odd then
GC D(x, y ) = GC D( x2 , y);
else if x is odd and y is even then
GC D(x, y ) = GC D( y2 , x);
else if x and y are both odd then
if x ≥ y then
, y);
GC D(x, y) = GC D( x−y
2
else
, x);
GC D(x, y) = GC D( y−x
2
end
end
until GC D(x, y) = GC D(0, y) = y;

B. Parallel Functions
To accomplish Algorithm 1 using CUDA, the following
three functions had to parallelized: shift, subtract, and greater
than-or-equal. As outlined in [3], each 1024-bit number is
divided across one warp so that each thread has its own 32-bit
integer.
The parallel shift function is straightforward: each thread is
given an equal-sized piece of the large-precision integer. Then

each thread except for Thread 0 grabs a copy of the integer at
threadID - 1. The variable threadID refers to a value
between 0 and 31 and corresponds to a thread in a warp. Each
thread shifts its value once and uses its copy of the adjacent
integer to determine if a bit has shifted between threads. This
procedure is outlined in Algorithm 2.
ALGORITHM 2: Parallel right shift
Input: x[32] is a 1024-bit integer represented as an array of 32
ints, threadI D is the 0-31 index of the thread in
warp.
if threadI D = 0 then
temp ← x[threadI D − 1];
else
temp ← 0;
end
x ← x >> 1;
x ← x OR (temp << 31);

The parallel subtract uses a method called carry skip from
[3]. First, each thread subtracts its piece and sets the “borrow”
ﬂag of threadID - 1 if an underﬂow occurred. Next, each
thread checks if it was borrowed from and if so, decrements
itself and clears the ﬂag. Then, if another underﬂow occurs,
the borrow ﬂag at threadID - 1 will be set. This continues
until all the borrow ﬂags are cleared. An outline can be found
in Algorithm 3.
ALGORITHM 3: Parallel subtract using “carry skip”
Input: x and y: two 1024-bit integers, threadI D is the 0-31
index of the thread in warp.
x[threadI D] ← x[threadI D] − y[threadI D];
if underﬂow then
set borrow[threadI D − 1];
end
repeat
if borrow[threadI D] is set then
x[threadI D] ← x[threadI D] − 1;
if underﬂow then
set borrow[threadI D − 1];
end
clear borrow[threadI D];
end
until all borrow ﬂags are cleared;

The parallel greater-than-or-equal has each thread check if
its integers are equal. If this is the case, then it sets a position
variable shared by the warp to the minimum of its threadID
and the current value stored in the position variable. This is
done atomically to ensure the correct value is stored. Finally,
all the threads do a greater-than-or-equal comparison with the
integers speciﬁed by the position variable. This function is
outlined in Algorithm 4.
C. Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of the binary GCD algorithm
has been shown by Stein and Vallée (cf. [6], [7]) to have a
worst case complexity of O(n2 ) where n is the number of bits

ALGORITHM 4: Parallel greater-than-or-equal-to
Input: x and y: two 1024-bit integers, threadI D is the 0-31
index of the thread in warp.
Output: T rue if x ≥ y; else F alse.
if x[threadI D] = y[threadI D] then
pos ← atomicMin(threadI D, pos);
end
return x[pos] ≥ y[pos]

Fig. 2.
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V. P RO BLEM D ESCRIPTION

Fig. 1.

The RSA weakness described above demands that each key
in a set be compared with each other key to determine if a
GCD greater than 1 exists for any pair. Given a known set of
keys, it is not known before processing the keys which will be
likely to have a GCD greater than 1; therefore, there is no way
to eliminate comparisons between speciﬁc pairs. The natural
organization to fulﬁll this requirement is a comparison matrix
of the all keys. Each location in the matrix corresponds to a
comparison between two keys.

Total percentage of CUDA implementation that is parallel

in the integer. The worst case is produced when each iteration
of the algorithm shifts one of its arguments only once. Since
for this application n is ﬁxed at 1024 bits, the complexity of a
single GCD calculation can be considered to be constant time
for the worst case.
To compare all the keys together, the amount of GCDs that
must be calculated grows at a rate of k 2 , where k is the number
of keys.

VI. I MPLEMENTAT ION
A. Problem Decomposition
Initially, the comparison matrix seems to be an n2 solution.
However, the diagonal of the matrix created consists of unpro
ductive GCD calculations since these entries would compare
each key with itself. Furthermore, the matrix is symmetrical
over the diagonal. Thus, only the comparisons comprising one
of the triangles needs to be performed. Speciﬁcally,

D. Theoretical Speedup

k

Total number of GCD compares =

Maximum speedup is deﬁned as follows:
Max Speedup =

1
1−P

(1)

where P is the percentage of the program’s execution that
can be parallelized. This percentage is a function of the
number of keys the program needs to process, and is calculated
in Equation 2.
t·g
P =
(2)
t·g+r·k
where
•
•
•
•

i

(3)

i=1

t = time to process a single GCD
g = total number of GCD calculations
r = time to read a single key
k = total number of keys

Since g will increase signiﬁcantly more rapidly than k, P
(based on equation 2) will approach 1 as k approaches inﬁnity.
This relationship can be observed in Figure 1.

This reduction in number of overall compares decreases the
work performed signiﬁcantly, shown in Figure 2.
B. Grid Organization
One of the most important aspects of any CUDA imple
mentation is the organization of the thread and block array
to ensure that the architecture is appropriately used to its
full potential. The thread array in this implementation was
organized using 3 dimensions. The x dimension represented
the sectioning of a 1024-bit value into individual 32-bit
integers, of which there are 32.
1024 bits per key
= 32 integers per key
32 bits per integer
The remaining dimensions, y and z, were set to 4, resulting
in a block of 512 threads. This design decision was experi
mentally determined. See §VI-D for details about Occupancy

optimizations.

Threads per block
Occupancy

32 · 4 · 4 = 512
This ensured that each block remained square for algorithmic
symmetry and simplicity. The y and z dimensions corre
sponded to how many speciﬁc keys within the list of all keys
were being compared per block. Thus, two 1024-bit keys were
loaded into each 32-thread warp, which was then processed
simultaneously as a single comparison. The x dimension was
chosen for two reasons: 1) so one thread in this dimension
would represent each of the 32-bit integers inside the key and
2) because there are 32 threads in a single warp. Therefore, this
thread-array organization ensured that compares were done
using two entire keys (separated into 32 pieces) that were
scheduled to the same warp. This eliminated warp divergence
since every warp was ﬁlled and executed with non-overlapping
data.
Blocks were arranged in row-major order based on the key
comparisons that they held. The formula for the number of
blocks, B, needed for a vector of keys of size k can be seen
in Equation 4.
k
4l
i=B
(4)
i=1

The limit for a grid in a single dimension is 216 −1 = 65535
which limits the amount of keys that can be processed to 1444.
To increase the number of blocks available for computation,
a second grid dimension was added. This increased the theo
retical maximum number of keys per kernel launch as seen in
Equation 5.
k
4

l
i≤ 2

16

−1

i=1

k ≤ 370716

128
67%

288
94%

512
100%

800
52%

TABLE I
TABLE GIVING OCCUPANCY FOR VARIOUS BLOCK DIMENSIONS

D. Occupancy
Each SM can be assigned multiple blocks at the same time
as long as there are enough free registers and shared memory
available. The ratio of active warps to the maximum number of
warps supported by a SM is called occupancy. On the Fermi
architecture, the maximum occupancy is achieved when there
are 48 active warps running on a SM at one time. Greater
occupancy gives a SM more opportunities to schedule warps
in a fashion to hide memory accesses, thus, saturating a SM
with many warps decreases performance impact. CUDA Fermi
cards have a total of 32768 registers and 49152 bytes of shared
memory per SM. The implementation here uses 17 registers
and 4762 bytes of shared memory per block and therefore
results in a maximum occupancy of 100%.
By using the CUDA occupancy calculator provided by
NVIDIA (cf. [8]), a table can be formed comparing the
threads per block with occupancy. To maintain the same block
organization outlined above, the block dimensions can be
2 × 2, 3 × 3, 4 × 4, 5 × 5 or 128, 228, 512, 800 threads, respec
tively. Table I shows the calculated occupancy for these block
sizes. A block size of 512 threads was chosen because it results
in the greatest occupancy and thus the best performance.
E. Bit-vector

2

(5)

C. Shared Memory
Shared memory was used to load the necessary keys from
global memory. Two arrays were created in shared memory,
representing the thread-array; both 3-dimensional, 32 × 4 × 4
and had an integer loaded into each available space. Each
array represented which integers would be compared at each
location in the matrix. A side effect of this organization was
that each key would be repeated 4 times within its integer
array. However, this greatly simpliﬁed the GCD algorithm
so that only a look-up into each array was needed. Since
shared memory was not the limiting factor for occupancy, it
was not a priority to optimize this aspect of the design and
implementation.
Shared memory was also used within the GCD algorithm,
speciﬁcally in the greater-than-or-equal-to function, and the
subtract function. In the greater-than-or-equal-to function, a
single integer was allocated for each comparison within a
block. Within the subtract function, shared memory was uti
lized to represent the borrow value for each integer.

The initial approach was to allocate a large, multi
dimensional array of integers that would hold the results of
the CUDA GCD calculations. This was allocated to the GPU,
so each thread could have access as needed; however, since
the number of results grew at n2 , the lack of scalability in
this approach was quickly apparent. Additionally, performance
decreased due to the large array that was being sent over the
PCIe bus. Memory transfers to the GPU are slow, and must
be minimized.
After more careful consideration, a new approach was
implemented. There would only be a single bit allocated per
key-compare to mark whether or not the pair had a GCD
greater than 1. In this way, only 2 bytes (16 bits = 1 bit per
compare) were necessary per block (4 · 4 = 16 compares per
block), as opposed to the previous 16 · 32 · 4 = 2048 bytes.
Despite not having access to the answer immediately after
returning from the kernel calculation, this approach would
be more efﬁcient since there would be a theoretically small
number of keys that actually returned with GCDs greater than
1 (i.e. the ﬂag was set). This small set could then be re
processed (GCDs calculated) using a different kernel or using
a CPU algorithm. Efﬁciency would also be increased due to the
time saved in memory transfers since there was signiﬁcantly
less memory to transfer before calling the kernel.

VII. E XPERIMENTAL S ETUP
A. Test Machine
All performance measurements were made on a single
machine with an Intel Xeon W3503 dual-core CPU and 4
GB of RAM. This machine has one NVIDIA GeForce GTX
480 GPU with 480 CUDA cores and 1.5 GB of memory. The
CUDA driver version present on the machine is 4.2.0, release
302.17, the runtime version is 4.2.9. The CUDA compute
capability is version 2.0, and the maximum threads per block
is 1024, with each warp having 32 threads.
B. Reference Implementations
In order to check the accuracy of the ﬁnal implementation,
as well as to provide a point of comparison for benchmarking,
two reference implementations of this exploit were created.
Each was able to use the same format key databases (described
in §VII-C).
The ﬁrst implementation was written purely in Python
using the open source PyCrypto cryptography library. This
implementation was able to perform the entire exploit, from
ﬁnding weak 1024-bit RSA public keys through generating the
discovered private keys. This implementation was not used for
performance comparison as it was dissimilar to the other two
implementations.
A sequential version of the binary GCD algorithm was
implemented to serve as a second validation tool for the CUDA
implementation. This version sequentially processed the same
input as both other implementations and produced output
of the same format. Comparison with this implementation
ensured that unexpected errors did not result merely from
processing the data in parallel.
C. Test Sets
In order to conduct meaningful tests, it was necessary to use
an identical data set in all tests. To facilitate this, a tool was
written in Python to generate both regular and intentionally
weak RSA key pairs using PyCrypto and store them in an
SQLite3 database. All keys were generated with a constant e of
65537, chosen because this was determined to be a commonly
used value (cf. [1]).
The generation process produced a database of RSA key
pairs. Intentionally weak keys were evenly distributed.
In order to generate a weak key, this program would
generate an initial normal RSA key but save the prime used
for p. For each subsequent bad key, p would be replaced with
this constant, and n was recalculated. The result was that
each weak key would have a GCD greater than 1 when tested
against any other weak key.
Using this tool, it was possible to build arbitrarily large test
sets with a known number of keys exhibiting the weakness.
When these databases were processed using any of the ref
erence implementations, the discovered number of weak keys
could be directly compared with the number of keys expected
to be found. This allowed both repeatable testing to measure
run time, and a method to validate the parallel algorithm was
indeed ﬁnding GCDs as expected.

Fig. 3.
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VIII. R ESULTS
The accuracy of the parallel implementation was veriﬁed
against the sequential implementation by using identical test
data sets with known weak keys. Since both implementations
found the same set of compromised keys, it was validated
that these two implementations were internally consistent.
Furthermore, both matched the results of the separate Python
reference implementation: supporting the assertion of accurate
functionality. The speedup of the CUDA implementation (seen
in Figure 3) was calculated by comparing its run time with that
of the sequential implementation. Compare this with Figure
1: this similarity is evidence of the implementation presented
here matching with theoretical expectations.
Figure 3 shows that speedup increases dramatically with
the number of keys until about 2000 comparisons. At this
point, the GPU becomes saturated with enough blocks to fully
occupy all of the SMs. Speedup remains constant at 27.5 for up
to 200000 keys. We have no data beyond this number of keys
due to the very long run time of the sequential implementation.
IX. C ONCLUSION
A large speedup resulted directly from writing a CUDA
implementation when compared to the sequential implemen
tation. Many more keys are able to be compared in a given
amount of time using the CUDA implementation.
A tool was developed to efﬁciently and completely compare
a list of 1024-bit RSA public keys, avoiding repetition and
unnecessary work. This tool allows an increased number of
keys to be compared in contrast to prior work, in turn allow
ing overall execution time to decrease due to the increased
parallelism.
The tool described in this paper offers signiﬁcant advantages
over other GCD algorithms in CUDA, and practically applies
this for comparison of 1024-bit RSA keys in order to test for
a particular weakness. There also exist several areas where
the implementation would beneﬁt from further investigation
and development including application of the GCDs, and
expansion to iterative kernel calls in order to handle even larger
sets of keys to compare.

Number of Keys
Sequential Time (sec)
CUDA Time (sec)
Speedup

20
0.13
0.21
0.6

200
5.59
0.31
18.0

2000
550.69
20.21
27.2

TABLE II
RUN - TIMES OF S EQ UENTIAL AND CUDA

X. F UTURE W ORK
The primary limiting factor of this implementation is the
amount of memory available on the GPU. Since all key com
binations must be computed to expose any potential weakness,
the kernel was structured to take a single vector of keys and
perform all possible comparisons. In order to process more
keys, either a GPU with more memory must be used, or the
algorithm must be modiﬁed in order to use multiple, iterative
kernel launches. The iterative kernel approach would require
memory to be separated into two sections that could each be
ﬁlled with subsections of the large, complete array of keys.
All comparisons would then be performed between the two
subsections by calling the kernel that is currently implemented.
Upon returning from the kernel, the data in one subsection
would be shifted, and all the compares would then be done
for those two sets of keys. This process would continue until
both vectors have iterated over all keys: speciﬁcally, the kernel
call would reside in a pair of nested for loops. This change
would allow the implementation presented here to process an
arbitrary number of keys.
To further enhance the above proposed addition, asyn
chronous memory transfers could also be added to the im
plementation. When combined with multiple kernel launches,
a signiﬁcant portion of the memory I/O (which is one of the
main limiting factors of performance using the GPU) would
be able to be masked by simultaneously processing the data
currently on the GPU while new data is being copied onto it.
An aspect that was originally intended for this project, but
was not implemented was to have the CUDA kernel return
the actual GCD of any keys that were found to be “weak” in
the sense there existed a GCD greater than 1. Since a large
majority of the GCDs found by our implementation are equal
to one, memory is wasted if all the results are transferred back
to the host. The most memory efﬁcient solution would include
dynamically allocating memory for any signiﬁcant results on
the device. This would remove the recalculation step in the
current implementation needed to produce private keys.
Recently NVIDIA has released information about a new
GPU architecture called Kepler[9]. The Kepler architecture
introduces new features that may increase the performance
of this implementation.

20000
55121.86
2005.09
27.5

200000
185551.91
6748.23
27.5

IMPLEMENTAT IONS

A feature known as Dynamic Parallelism allows a CUDA
kernel to launch new kernels from the GPU. This would
allow dynamic allocation of block sizes for different areas
of the comparison matrix and remove idle threads from the
kernel. Hyper-Q is a new technology that manages multiple
CUDA kernels from multiple CPU threads. With the current
Fermi architecture, only one CUDA kernel may run on the
device at one time. This can lead to under utilization of the
GPU hardware. An approach using multiple CPU threads,
each running their own CUDA kernel, could greatly increase
throughput.
The ﬁnal missing component of this implementation would
be to complete the algorithm and use the GCDs which are
being calculated to generate RSA private key pairs. In order
to do this, a heterogeneous multi-process approach may be
most straightforward. After the parallel run completes, the bitvector of results would be examined to ﬁnd the key pairs which
produced GCDs greater than one. In these cases, the GCD
would be recomputed, and used as either p or q. Once this
was done, the missing prime would be computed, then based
on this, d would be found. The resulting RSA public/private
key pair could be exported or stored for later veriﬁcation.
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